Condemning the Decisions of the Past: Eminent Domain and Democratic Accountability by Serkin, Christopher
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 38
Number 4 Symposium - Taking New York:
Opportunities, Challenges, & Dangers Posed By the Use
of Eminent Domain in New York
Article 6
2011
Condemning the Decisions of the Past: Eminent
Domain and Democratic Accountability
Christopher Serkin
Brooklyn Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Serkin, Condemning the Decisions of the Past: Eminent Domain and Democratic Accountability, 38 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1175
(2011).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol38/iss4/6
Condemning the Decisions of the Past: Eminent Domain and Democratic
Accountability
Cover Page Footnote
Thanks to Brooklyn Law School for supporting this project.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol38/iss4/6
SERKIN_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011 7:03 PM 
 
1175 
CONDEMNING THE DECISIONS OF THE PAST: 
EMINENT DOMAIN AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Christopher Serkin∗ 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 1175 
  I.  Entrenchment by Another Name ....................................................... 1177 
  II.  Eminent Domain in New York ........................................................ 1181 
A. The Built Environment .......................................................... 1182 
1. Rejuvenating Times Square ............................................. 1182 
2. Reclaiming the Waterfront............................................... 1184 
B. Vested Rights ......................................................................... 1185 
1. Reinventing Taxis ............................................................ 1185 
2. Rethinking Inlet Park ....................................................... 1187 
C. Critical Assets ........................................................................ 1188 
1. Selling Parking Meters .................................................... 1188 
2. Moving Prisoners ............................................................. 1189 
  III.  Evaluating Eminent Domain ........................................................... 1191 
INTRODUCTION 
Eminent domain represents a critical and contested point of intersection 
between government power and private property rights. As debates over 
eminent domain have leapt from the pages of academic articles1 to legisla-
tures2 and even to popular culture,3 the battle lines have largely crystal-
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Thanks to Brooklyn Law School for 
supporting this project. 
 1. Since Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), much ink has been spilled 
on the problem of eminent domain.  The bibliography is far too vast to catalogue here.  For 
the leading pre-Kelo article, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 COR-
NELL L. REV. 61 (1986). 
 2. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response 
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (summarizing legislative responses). 
 3.  See, e.g., Charles Isherwood, A Brooklyn Civics Lesson, Offered in Word and Song, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at C1 (“As subjects for musical comedy go, it would be hard to 
fathom anything less promising than the legal intricacies of the concept of eminent domain.  
. . . Yet [it is] rhapsodized in song with style and wit in the spirited new show from the Civi-
lians . . . .”). 
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lized.  Most people now seem to agree that eminent domain, for better or 
worse, is primarily a tool for the government to use to assemble property 
and overcome holdouts.4  In this Essay, I argue that an entirely different in-
terest is also at stake.  Eminent domain serves an important structural role 
in American democracy—ensuring that governments are not bound by the 
policy choices of their predecessors.5  In this account, eminent domain is a 
tool for acquiring not just property, but also democratic legitimacy. 
It is a core principle of democracy that one government is not allowed to 
make policy choices for future governments.6  Democratic power requires 
that a representative government be responsive to the will of its own consti-
tuents, not the constituents of the past.  For that reason, legislatures are not 
allowed to pass unrepealable legislation, and constitutions contain mechan-
isms for amendment.7  Despite the prohibition on entrenchment, as it is 
usually called, governments have many tools at their disposal to propel 
their policy preferences into the future.8  Among the most powerful but 
least theorized are those that rely on private rights.  Long-term government 
contracts, physical developments, and property conveyances in many forms 
can lock in policy preferences beyond a single legislative lifecycle.9  Faced 
with incorporeal and physical manifestations of past policies, eminent do-
main is an important tool for subsequent governments to de-entrench those 
preferences, buying back policy control from the past. 
 
 4. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25 
(2004) (discussing holdout problem and eminent domain); Abraham Bell & Gideon Par-
chomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1674 
(2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 101, 138 (2006). 
 5. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local 
Governments, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Serkin, Public Entrenchment] (on 
file with author). 
 6. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and 
Retroactivity, 12 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381-404 (1987). 
 7. Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 
1599-1600 (2010) (discussing constitutional amendments in context of entrenchment). 
 8. Examples include bicameralism, staggered-term agency appointments, and the Con-
stitution itself. See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1631, 1631 (2009) (“[A] constitution burdens rather than benefits future generations by li-
miting their political freedom to choose policies that, in their judgment, best serve their in-
terests.”); William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. 
L.J. 523, 528 (1992) (discussing bicameralism); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems 
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1153, 1213 (2009) (identifying staggered-term appointments as mechanism for reducing po-
litical responsiveness of agency officials); see also Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 7, at 
1586 (“[I]deas of entrenchment are central to the notion of constitutions.”). 
 9. See Serkin, Public Entrenchment, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing public entrenchment 
through private law). 
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This is not just abstract political theory.  Indeed, viewed through the lens 
of entrenchment, New York provides ready examples of eminent domain’s 
role in changing policies adopted by previous governments.  This Essay 
examines some of those examples, and also current policies that future 
governments might need eminent domain to undo.  This Essay therefore 
highlights a seldom-explored role for eminent domain: preserving the abili-
ty of New York’s elected representatives to respond to the will of the 
people. 
I.  ENTRENCHMENT BY ANOTHER NAME 
Eminent domain plays no obvious role in traditional debates about legis-
lative entrenchment.  Entrenchment, as typically conceived, refers to unre-
pealable legislation—that is, public laws that are binding into the future.10  
Eminent domain is irrelevant in that context.  But entrenchment concerns 
should not be so narrowly construed.  Indeed, the concerns animating pro-
hibitions on entrenchment apply far more broadly than just to unrepealable 
legislation, and once the range of entrenching government actions is ex-
panded to include commitments made through private law, the importance 
of eminent domain is easy to see. 
In political science terms, anti-entrenchment rules are about preserving 
sovereignty and democratic accountability.  A genuinely democratic gov-
ernment must be able to respond to the will of its constituents, and that 
means today’s constituents, not yesterday’s.11  There can be no democratic 
accountability—indeed, there can be no sovereignty—if the power to act 
has been captured by a previous government.12  Imagine a state passing a 
meta law declaring that it, and all other existing laws, could never be 
changed.  What power would subsequent governments have?  The very 
idea of a government as rule maker would disappear.  Governments’ pow-
ers are limited by the immutable policies they inherit. 
The inter-temporal allocation of power is something of a zero sum game.  
Allowing governments to decide their laws’ temporal reach would increase 
the power—and, hence, the democratic responsiveness—of the enacting 
 
 10. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reap-
praisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1667 (2002) (defining entrenchment). 
 11. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections?  Using Consent Decrees to Insu-
late Policies From Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 296 (“Future lawmakers 
have just as much power to depart from the decisions of their forbears as their forbears had 
to make the decisions in the first place.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 6, at 392 (“If Parliament is to remain supreme, it must 
necessarily retain the power to make or unmake any law.”). 
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government.13  But it comes at the expense of future governments.  Of 
course, prohibiting entrenchment has the opposite effect, giving authority 
to the present and divesting it from the past.  Nevertheless, democracy has 
a strongly presentist prejudice, and its concern is primarily with the ability 
of the government to respond to the will of the people today, but only inso-
far as it preserves the power of future governments to be similarly respon-
sive. 
There is an important functional justification for anti-entrenchment rules 
as well: preventing inter-temporal externalities.  Some entrenching gov-
ernment actions allow a government to reap benefits today while shifting 
the costs onto the future.  Debt is perhaps the most familiar example.14  
Politicians often refer to government borrowing as “mortgaging the fu-
ture.”15  At the most general level, this concept is absolutely right.  Debt of 
any kind allows a government to collect a pile of cash today, while externa-
lizing the costs of repaying onto future generations.  A resulting temporal 
misalignment of costs and benefits can be a recipe for political malfunction 
and abuse.16 
The underlying concerns about entrenchment exist, then, whenever one 
government can make precommitments that are binding on the future.  At 
this level of generality, entrenchment is ubiquitous.  Everything that a gov-
ernment does will limit future policy choices.  Building out infrastructure, 
like roads or mass transit, will determine the shape of future development, 
as will forgoing such investments. Entrenchment concerns are most serious, 
however, when a government, by making a specific policy precommitment, 
can reap immediate benefits while shifting the costs to the future.  It is easy 
to identify some examples where entrenchment concerns are likely to be 
particularly acute. 
 
 13. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 1672 (describing entrenchment as 
increasing the power of a government to set policy). 
 14. See Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State 
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 918 (2003); C. Dickerman Williams & Peter R. 
Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements As Affected By Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 177, 182 (1937) (“[I]n any system of public economy bonded debt is merely a 
means of allocating payment between the present and the future.”). 
 15. E.g., Billy House & Clifford Marks, Boehner Reacts Coolly to Geithner’s Warning 
on Debt Limit, NAT’L J., Jan. 6, 2011 (“[W]e cannot continue to borrow recklessly, dig our-
selves deeper into this hole, and mortgage the future of our children and grandchildren.”). 
 16. Where debt is used to finance investments that generate benefits for future genera-
tions—like roads, which generate positive inter-temporal externalities—debt can be a useful 
tool for aligning costs and benefits. Nancy Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced 
Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1141 (1998) (“The use of public debt to pay for capital 
expenditures would distribute the cost of the long-lasting goods, among all the beneficiaries 
throughout time.”).  Indeed, without some mechanism for spreading costs over time, gov-
ernments may under-invest in resources that generate significant benefits in the future. 
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In addition to debt, long-term contracts can allow a government to se-
cure an immediate benefit from a private counter-party while binding fu-
ture governments to the terms of the contract.  Whether a procurement con-
tract for the provision of services or a development agreement promising 
future regulatory treatment, the effect is the same: the government can ob-
tain an immediate or short-term benefit by binding itself to some future 
conduct. 
Property arrangements can similarly generate immediate gains while 
pushing costs forward.  Selling off assets is one example.17  Privatizing 
municipal functions can generate money (or other beneficial services) to-
day, but lock the government into a private contract for the outsourced 
good or service.  More ephemeral property rights can also be entrenching.  
A government that allows property rights to vest—whether development 
rights, a public franchise, or pension benefits—creates rights that run 
against subsequent governments and, in the process, locks in policy choices 
surrounding land use policy or labor arrangements.  Physical development, 
too, can generate short-term gains and long-term policy constraints.  A 
government receives a short-term political and economic boost from siting 
a new stadium or even just a big box store, but in the process limits subse-
quent governments’ ability to adopt a different strategy for economic de-
velopment. 
Of course, government actions are not necessarily inappropriate simply 
because they are entrenching.  The benefits of entering into binding pre-
commitments can easily outweigh the costs.  Return to the example of mu-
nicipal debt.  The ability to borrow money—whether through bonds or oth-
erwise—depends fundamentally on the enforceability of the repayment 
obligation.  If every government could decide for itself whether to honor its 
financial obligations, the cost of borrowing money would presumably be-
come exorbitant.18  Likewise, all governments would be worse off without 
some capacity to enter into long-term procurement contracts, which allow 
them to minimize risks of price fluctuations and supply disruptions.  The 
point is simply this: many government actions implicate a particularly 
complicated trade-off between short-term benefits and long-term costs.  
There is reason to worry that government actors are not incentivized to bal-
ance these appropriately, and so long-term government precommitments 
 
 17. See Julie Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2011) (discussing similarity between selling assets and incurring debt). 
 18. See Stewart Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts 
Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 699 (1988) (“When a legislature repudiates a contract, it 
demoralizes its contract partners, and that demoralization is likely to make future legislative 
contracting—even if efficient—more difficult or expensive.”). 
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can create private law obligations that inappropriately limit future policy 
choices. 
The risk of inter-temporal power grabs has given rise to various legal 
responses.  There are some actions that governments simply cannot under-
take.  Most directly, governments cannot enact unrepealable legislation.  A 
subsequent government can always change the law.  But other kinds of pro-
tections are in place that prevent entrenchment in its other forms.  For ex-
ample, state constitutions often impose substantive limits on indebtedness 
and also provide complex procedural hurdles that a government must clear 
before incurring general recourse debt.19  These arose out of a realization in 
the nineteenth century that governments have an incentive to borrow too 
heavily against the future.20  Similarly, governments cannot enter into en-
forceable contracts promising future regulatory treatment.21  The only not-
able exceptions are development agreements, which generally require statu-
tory authorization and then include significant procedural protections to 
minimize the risk of political malfunction.22 
In general, though, outright prohibitions on government actions are few 
and far between.  They operate at the fringe to take the most extreme en-
trenchment risks off the table, but do not address the more run-of-the-mill 
government actions that can nevertheless impose significant costs and poli-
cy constraints on the future.  More important, then, are the legal doctrines 
that protect subsequent governments’ ability to change course, even if at 
some financial or political expense. 
Chief among these is the general inapplicability of injunctive relief 
against governments for breach of contract.23  A government cannot be 
forced to continue performing under a contract, so long as it compensates 
the injured party for the breach.  More subtly, but perhaps even more pro-
 
 19. See Briffault, supra note 14, at 915-16 (surveying approaches to debt limits); Clay-
ton Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1255-56 (2009) (describing his-
tory of debt limits). 
 20. E.g., Briffault, supra note 14, at 918 (“A central justification of constitutional limits 
on debt is to offset the temptations that can cause elected officials to burden future genera-
tions with unnecessary debt.”); Sterk, supra note 18, at 720-21 (“[The] very existence [of 
debt limits] demonstrates that the attempt to develop institutional mechanisms to cope with 
the problem of legislative discontinuity has been longstanding.”). 
 21. E.g., Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping From the Govern-
mental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277, 379 (1990). 
 22. See Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is Nei-
ther Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 396-99 (2004) (de-
scribing requirements). 
 23. E.g., Frank Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 19, 37 (“By and large even authorized contracts may not be specifically enforced 
against governments.”). 
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foundly, governments are not generally liable for expectation damages 
when they breach contracts.  Instead, and unlike private parties, they are 
typically liable only for reliance damages—that is, the damages that the 
counterparty actually incurred from relying on the government.24  In the 
context of procurement contracts, courts will often imply a “termination for 
convenience” clause, allowing the government to breach unilaterally by 
paying only reliance damages.25  If the government no longer needs its 
widget contract, it can terminate without paying full expectation damages. 
Limits on contract remedies, however, do not protect governments from 
all kinds of inherited precommitments.  Breach is no relief from the en-
trenching effect of vested rights or from actual development.  In these con-
texts, something stronger is needed to preserve flexibility for future gov-
ernments, and that something is eminent domain.  In addition to the power 
to take real property, eminent domain applies to vested development rights, 
contract rights, and also more esoteric future interests in property.  Eminent 
domain allows a government to change course on the use of property and 
on matters of urban policy from the location of adult uses to transportation 
and other infrastructure.  It is, in short, a de-entrenching tool of last resort, 
and its availability is a backstop to the power of government to decide poli-
cy for itself and not to be tied to the preferences of the past. 
II.  EMINENT DOMAIN IN NEW YORK 
This symposium’s topic, eminent domain in New York, provides a use-
ful opportunity to examine actual examples of a government using eminent 
domain to change a prior government’s policy decision.  The goal here is to 
provide a cross-section of examples that is as broad as possible with regard 
to the nature of the policy at issue and the kind of property being taken.  It 
also includes different temporal perspectives, identifying some instances 
where the city has exercised eminent domain to reverse a policy decision, 
and others in which the city has recently adopted a policy (or is considering 
adopting a policy) that would require eminent domain in the future to undo. 
Admittedly, not all of the examples below present the issue as cleanly as 
one might hope.  Some involve merely the threat of eminent domain, some 
involve contestable claims about the content of earlier governments’ policy 
choices, and some rely on events that almost but did not quite come to pass.  
 
 24. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, 
1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 354-57 (1999); Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and 
the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific 
Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 212-13 (1998). 
 25. Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 
1567 n.150 (1992). 
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Nevertheless, all of the examples at least gesture at the role that eminent 
domain did play, could have played, or might still play in preserving a gov-
ernment’s power to decide policy for itself. 
A. The Built Environment 
The most straightforward examples of the de-entrenching power of emi-
nent domain involve changes in land use policy that rely on eminent do-
main to alter the built environment.  At the most general level, the problem 
of existing uses has been around for as long as zoning.26  The constraints of 
established land uses can transform forward-looking land use planning into 
a mere codification of pre-existing development patterns.27 
Of course, the point of land use policy is to stimulate private develop-
ment consistent with the government’s plans and priorities.  A government 
can reap substantial benefits from that private reliance, whether political 
benefits from developers or property owners, financial benefits from exac-
tions and other developer concessions, or general benefits from a temporary 
uptick in economic activity through the development itself.  But in the face 
of those immediate gains, governments (and government actors) may be 
insufficiently attentive to the costs of the development down the road. In 
those situations, eminent domain can be a critical tool for implementing 
prospective changes in land use policy where prior policies have resulted in 
private development that is inconsistent with new plans and priorities. Two 
examples come readily to mind: Times Square, and the New York City wa-
terfront. 
1. Rejuvenating Times Square 
Adult uses pose a particular urban policy challenge to local govern-
ments, and New York City is no exception.  First Amendment rules estab-
lished by the Supreme Court prevent a government from banning adult uses 
altogether and allow regulating them only to prevent secondary effects.28  
Responding to these limits, local governments have adopted one of two di-
ametrically opposed land use strategies.  Some have sought to exclude 
adult uses from most parts of a municipality in order to limit the neighbor-
 
 26. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (2009) [hereinafter Serkin, Existing Uses] (noting that existing 
use problems were discussed during the formation of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act of 
1926). 
 27. Id. at 1225 n.7 (citing sources). 
 28. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) 
(noting that ordinances aimed at secondary effects of adult entertainment on the surrounding 
community can be valid); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
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hoods exposed to them.  This, of course, has the effect of concentrating 
adult uses in a few places.  Others have sought to disperse concentrated 
adult uses to prevent the development of a red light district or skid row.29 
In the 1970s, New York City was squarely in the prior camp.  Indeed, in 
1976, responding to concerns about the proliferation of adult uses in new 
neighborhoods, New York City adopted a zoning ordinance relegating 
“adult physical culture establishments” to Times Square.30  This was a de-
liberate policy decision to protect other residential and commercial districts 
from adult uses, and the effect was obvious to any Times Square visitor. 
Within a few years, however, New York City decided to change course.  
In the 1980s, under Mayor Ed Koch, the City initiated a redevelopment 
plan that called for dispersing the adult uses in Times Square.31  The exist-
ing adult businesses, however, were entitled to constitutional protection 
against zoning changes.32  A central component of the plan therefore called 
for condemning some of the adult uses and breaking up their concentrated 
hold on the neighborhood.33  Eminent domain was a central tool in revers-
ing the policy decision to concentrate adult uses in Times Square and 
helped to implement the new policy of dispersing them throughout the City 
to reclaim Times Square. 
Whatever the relative merits of these two approaches—and reasonable 
minds continue to disagree—the entrenchment point is simply this: differ-
ent governments may want to adopt very different urban policy responses 
to the problem of adult uses (and, presumably, other forms of locally un-
wanted land uses (LULUs) as well).  The ability to carry out a policy prefe-
rence, however, may depend on the government’s ability to compel a 
change in the use of property, whether to disperse concentrated adult uses 
or to remove them from a neighborhood in order to concentrate them 
somewhere else.  The point can easily be generalized.  Existing uses of 
property are often the vestiges of earlier governments’ decisions and may 
impede or even prevent changes in policy preferences.  Eminent domain 
ensures that those vestigial uses do not perpetuate the failed (or at least 
anachronistic) policy choices of the past. 
 
 29. See, e.g., North Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 88 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir. 
1996) (summarizing approaches). 
 30. See CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ADULT ENTERTAINMENT STUDY 
32 (1994). 
 31. See Did Guiliani Really Clean Up Times Square?, CBS NEWS, Dec. 28, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/28/politics/main3655538.shtml. 
 32. See Serkin, Existing Uses, supra note 26 (discussing constitutional protection for 
existing uses). 
 33. See Charles V. Bagli, Slow Economy Likely to Stall Atlantic Yards, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2008, at C1. 
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2. Reclaiming the Waterfront 
Perhaps no figure in New York’s history had more influence on the 
City’s development patterns than Robert Moses.34  He created most of the 
bridges, parkways, and expressways that connect New York’s five bo-
roughs to each other and to the suburbs.35  In the process, he cut through 
existing neighborhoods displacing, by some accounts, 500,000 people.36  
His use of eminent domain to effect a particular vision of “urban renewal” 
was, for better or worse (and mostly worse), a way of de-entrenching the 
more organic development patterns the City had promoted earlier in its his-
tory. He was, in part, reclaiming planning authority that New York City 
had turned over to private parties.37  More interesting for present purposes, 
though, is the current use of eminent domain to begin to undo some of the 
Moses legacy and policy choices that he made. 
Consider, for example, the decision under Moses to ring the City with 
expressways providing what was once easy access into and out of the City 
by car.  The plan created great benefits for the City at the time—and for 
Robert Moses personally—partly because of the scale of the public invest-
ment the plans represented.38  The unfortunate long-term result, however, 
was to cut the City off from its waterfront, turning great swaths of what 
could have been the most desirable real estate into decaying warehouses 
and industrial husks.39  Moses’ legacy of roads and bridges are physical 
vestiges of specific policy decisions about the relationship between New 
York City and its more rural environs, and about how to get from one to the 
other. 
In more recent years, New York City has tried to change course on some 
of these decisions, but it is a process that invariably involves moving or 
shifting roads yet again, and displacing some of the uses of land that devel-
oped around the existing infrastructure.  Consider, for example, the recla-
mation of the waterfront in Brooklyn, underneath the Promenade, to make 
the new Brooklyn Bridge Park.  Unfortunately, the Brooklyn Queens Ex-
pressway (the BQE in local speak) separates picturesque Brooklyn Heights 
 
 34. For the leading historical treatment of Moses’ career, see ROBERT A. CARO, THE 
POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK (1999). 
 35. Id. at 5-9 (describing Moses’ projects). 
 36. Id. at 20 (“[T]here are available no accurate figures on the total number of people 
evicted from their homes for all Robert Moses public works, but the figure is almost certain-
ly close to half a million.”). 
 37. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 45 (1983) (discussing 
New York City’s eighteenth century waterfront grants to private parties as abandonment of 
future planning power). 
 38. See CARO, supra note 34, at 5-15 (describing benefits of Moses’ plans). 
 39. See PHILLIP LOPATE, WATERFRONT: A WALK AROUND MANHATTAN 80 (2004). 
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from the new park.  In a remarkable feat of engineering, the BQE is canti-
levered out from a cliff so that it is below a pedestrian promenade, but 
above the river.  It therefore serves as a physical barrier to the East River.  
To change this land use decision and re-open the waterfront, the City and 
the U.S. Department of Transportation are undertaking a project to replace 
this critical stretch of the BQE, “[f]amous for its rush-hour traffic,”40 either 
by enclosing it in a large tunnel or perhaps by re-routing it under a different 
part of Brooklyn.  In either case, effectuating this changed policy toward 
waterfront development has and will continue to require eminent domain to 
overcome the problem of the BQE.  The same dynamic is at work through-
out the city with its efforts to reclaim the waterfront. 
B. Vested Rights 
Vested rights provide a more ephemeral constraint on changes in public 
policy.  A government might allow or encourage rights to vest in order to 
induce reliance by private parties.  The paradigmatic example here would 
be a government allowing development rights to vest in order to attract a 
developer.  But more uniquely New York examples exist, too, and include 
taxi medallions and a power plant in Brooklyn.  These are both examples of 
current policies that are—or, in the case of the power plant, almost were—
locked in through vested rights doctrines.  If the City wanted to change 
course sometime in the future, it might have to use eminent domain to ad-
dress these and similar places in which vested rights reflect the inherited 
policy preferences of a prior government. 
1. Reinventing Taxis 
There are perhaps few sites more evocative of New York than the para-
digmatic Yellow Cab.  A major component of New York City’s transporta-
tion system, cabs are ubiquitous throughout the City and, unlike in most ci-
ties in the world, can (usually) be hailed easily from (almost) any street 
corner.  But cabs are more than personal yellow buses.  They are also roll-
ing financial assets.  Each Yellow Cab in New York is required to obtain a 
license to do business and that license takes the form of a transferable me-
dallion.41  Those medallions, limited in number, are worth vast sums of 
money.  Many yellow cab passengers would be shocked to learn that the 
 
 40. NEW YORK ACCELERATED CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, ENVISIONING 
THE FUTURE: THE BQE TRIPLE CANTILEVER PROJECT 1 (2006), available at http://www.fhwa 
.dot.gov/construction/accelerated/wsbqe06.pdf (describing the project). 
 41. See Katrina M. Wyman, Is Bentham Right? The Case of New York City Taxi Me-
dallions (Dec. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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cab is worth more than they are; individual medallions have sold for hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars.42 
But what is the property status of those medallions?  As Katrina Wyman 
details in her thoughtful and careful history, they are licenses conferred by 
the City.  Originally, licensees would simply return them to the City when 
they were done with them, and the City would reissue them to someone 
else.43  Over time, however, the city changed course and made them trans-
ferable.44  It also restricted the number of medallions in circulation.45  This 
scarcity turned the medallions into valuable assets that may represent con-
tractually vested property rights, which, in turn, means that the medallion 
licensing system has entrenched a regulatory approach to an entire industry. 
This might prove extremely problematic.  In the not-too-distant past 
when times were more flush, the relative scarcity of cabs became some-
thing of a hot-button political issue.  Riders complained of the difficulty of 
getting cabs at peak times, and many people have complained for years 
about the absence of cabs in under-served neighborhoods.46  One potential 
response would be to dramatically increase the number of cabs on the road 
or even to remove the medallion system in exchange for some other form 
of licensing requirement—perhaps a license that is personal to the driver 
instead of one that moves with the car. 
The problem, of course, is that the existing medallion holders would 
fiercely object.  Such changes would dramatically reduce, if not wipe out, 
the value of their significant investments.  It is, of course, possible that the 
government would be able to act anyway; that regulatory takings doctrine 
or the Due Process Clause, for example, would not stretch far enough to 
protect medallions.47  But they might.  In the face of constitutional protec-
tion, then, the only real option available to the City would be to take the 
medallions by eminent domain.48  This is hardly likely to happen any time 
soon, but eminent domain would again prove crucial in effectuating a poli-
cy change that would result in divesting people of valuable property rights. 
 
 42. Tracy Connor, Cab Licenses at Cadillac Prices, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 30, 2007 
(detailing sale of two medallions for $600,000 each). 
 43. See Wyman, supra note 41. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. The issue has reared its head again. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Where Do All the 
Cabs Go in the Late Afternoon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at A18. 
 47. See Wyman, supra note 41 (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not offer medallion 
owners much protection, and the Takings Clause likely does not safeguard them at all.”). 
 48. Alternatively, the governments could use inverse condemnation, but I will avoid dis-
tinguishing between them as their differences turn only on regulatory strategy and not on the 
underlying substance of the government’s actions. 
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2. Rethinking Inlet Park 
The second example is really a case of rights that almost vested but ul-
timately did not.  Nevertheless, it presents the issue of policy change clean-
ly, and so serves as a particularly useful illustration of the potentially en-
trenching power of vested rights. 
New York City faces real strains on its electricity supply.  For years 
now, TransGas has been looking to build a new power plant for New York 
City.  There appears to be demand for a new power plant, but its siting is 
controversial.  In 1997, the Giuliani administration suggested a location in 
Williamsburg, Brooklyn, on the waterfront and near important infrastruc-
ture support.49  Plans progressed, and TransGas applied for the various 
permits to build the plant.  In the meantime, however, Michael Bloomberg 
replaced Giuliani as Mayor of New York and had a very different vision for 
waterfront development in Brooklyn.  Instead of a power plant, he sup-
ported building a new park, to be called the Bushwick Inlet Park.  This 
change in policy preferences put the TransGas power plant at the center of 
a controversy over the development of the area and spawned years of litiga-
tion.50 
The plant triggered a significant fight at the City and community levels 
over the use of the property.  With the TransGas applications pending, the 
Bloomberg administration sought to rezone the property.  At the time, pro-
ponents of the City’s new plans warned that failure to rezone the property 
as soon as possible might allow the power plant to go forward.51  Presuma-
bly, they were at least partly concerned that development rights might vest 
in the interim, at which point the plant would become a protected prior 
non-conforming use in any subsequent rezoning. 
As it turns out, the relevant state agency ultimately denied TransGas 
permission to build on the site, and courts have rejected appeals of that de-
cision.52  TransGas therefore had no opportunity to obtain vested develop-
ment rights, and the City never had to use, or even threaten to use, eminent 
domain.  Nevertheless, the dynamic is clear enough and would be easy to 
replicate.  A city seeking to immunize development plans from regulatory 
 
 49. See Matthew Schuerman, TransGas Maverick Adam Victor Hits City Hall Where It 
Hurts, N.Y. OBSERVER, Mar. 6, 2005, available at http://www.observer.com/node/50472. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Hugh Son, Plan Would Stop Plant By Rezone Not So Fast, Critics Say, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 2005, available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2005-04-29/local/ 
18294987_1_rezoning-affordable-housing-greenpoint. 
 52. See Samuel Newhouse, Appellate Division Dismisses TransGas Plans for Brooklyn 
Power Plant, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Jan. 12, 2011, available at http://www.brooklyn 
eagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=4&id=31063. 
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change can help a private developer obtain vested rights that will then run 
against subsequent governments. 
C. Critical Assets 
Another form of entrenchment can arise from alienating public assets.  
Certain kinds of public resources are intimately bound up with policy deci-
sions, and their sale can therefore significantly constrain subsequent gov-
ernments’ ability to chart a different course.  Here, the examples become 
more speculative and include plans that would have locked in policy 
through asset sales, had they happened. 
1. Selling Parking Meters 
Recently, New York City contemplated selling one of its valuable in-
come-producing assets: its parking meters (and the right to collect fees 
from them).53  Modeled on a similar move by Chicago, the City is at least 
considering selling off a long-term right to the parking meters for a one-
time payment of nearly five billion dollars.54  Such a move would, of 
course, be financially entrenching.  As one Chicago Alderman characte-
rized the deal Chicago had struck: “It filled the budget gap for one year. . . . 
Now, we’ve lost our revenue stream for the next 70 or so years.”55 
Of course, eminent domain is no remedy for the lost income stream.  
The obligation to pay just compensation means that a government cannot 
simply avoid its future debt obligations or recapture lost income for free.  
Protection from such financial entrenchment requires a different set of tools 
and mechanisms—bankruptcy, and the like—and is therefore outside the 
scope of this Symposium.56  But the sale of the parking meters raises a sub-
sidiary set of entrenchment concerns relating to parking enforcement and 
parking policy. 
The Chicago experience is telling.  Shortly after Chicago conveyed away 
its parking meters, perceived failures in private operation of the parking 
 
 53. See David Seifman, City Mulls $5B Meter Sell-Off, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, availa-
ble at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/city_mulls_meter_sell_off_53FEAGOGzvBfxQ 
uXDs5JZL. 
 54. For a summary of the Chicago deal, see Andrew Stern, Chicago Leases Parking Me-
ters for $1.16 Billion, REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
bondsNews/idUSN0227950220081202. 
 55. Seifman, supra note 53. 
 56. It is, however, taken up in my longer treatment of related issues. See Serkin, Public 
Entrenchment, supra note 5. 
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system created an enormous political backlash.57  Broken equipment and 
generally poor oversight led some Chicago politicians to call for a morato-
rium on parking enforcement until the private company could upgrade its 
operations.58  But imagine if the City had gone a step further and decided 
that the sale itself was a mistake.  Changing policy and returning the park-
ing system to one of public accountability would then necessitate reacquir-
ing the asset.  Depending on the private owner’s willingness to sell volunta-
rily, that may require eminent domain (or at least its threat). 
More broadly, too, privatizing the parking meters may lock in (or forec-
lose) other policy options, depending on the terms of the contract.  Parking 
policy, after all, is not just about meters and tickets.  Offering free parking 
in certain places or during certain times of year can be a tool for stimulat-
ing shopping and commercial activity.  Reducing the number of available 
parking spaces can be a kind of implicit tax on drivers and could therefore 
reduce the number of cars in the City.  In short, parking systems can be a 
crucial link in a broader system of transportation and economic policy, and 
privatizing the meters can immunize that particular connection from subse-
quent policy change—at least in the absence of the power of eminent do-
main. 
2. Moving Prisoners 
New York City has five different jails for its inmates.  The largest, by 
far, is Rikers Island.59  In the 1990s, New York’s inmate population was on 
the decline and it decided to begin closing jails in the outer boroughs, in-
cluding the Brooklyn House of Detention, and centralizing operations at 
Rikers.60  The City anticipated benefitting from economies of scale, and 
neighbors of the Brooklyn facility were thrilled that the jail was closing.61  
Indeed, the jail was located in a small island of downtown Brooklyn that 
had steadfastly resisted the surrounding area’s gentrification.62 
Shortly after the Brooklyn House of Detention closed, development in 
the neighborhood picked up.  New condos went up on all sides, new busi-
nesses moved in, and the area underwent a nearly immediate renaissance.  
 
 57. See Dan Mihalopoulos, Company Piles Up Profits From City’s Parking Meter Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A29 (describing early failings). 
 58. See id. (describing moratorium on ticket writing). 
 59. See An Overview of NYC DOC Facilities, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/doc/html/about/facilities_overview.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2011). 
 60. John Eligon, City Moves to Reopen a Brooklyn Jail Shuttered in 2003, but Drops 
Plans to Expand It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at A26. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
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Indeed, it was so successful that City Comptroller William Thompson pro-
posed selling the facility and converting it to condos (have fun imagining 
possible names for the building!).63 
In 2010, the City decided to reopen the jail.  Some buildings on Rikers 
Island were in bad disrepair, and transporting prisoners back and forth from 
Rikers Island proved difficult. The City felt that its best option was to re-
open the vacant Brooklyn House of Detention over the strenuous objections 
of neighbors.64  This was, of course, only possible because the City had de-
cided not to sell the building.  It had, in other words, resisted the potentially 
entrenching act of selling the building and instead had kept it vacant and 
unused for several years while it was experimenting with its new policies.  
But what if it had not?  What if Comptroller Thompson had had his way? 
The potential role of eminent domain in this scenario requires some un-
packing.  Its de-entrenching power is easy enough to see if the City had 
changed its mind about housing prisoners in between the time it sold the 
building and work had begun to demolish or retrofit it. In that case, the 
building would still have been there, ready to be reopened, and eminent 
domain would have restored the pre-sale status quo.  Of course, if the fa-
cility were no longer there, siting a new facility becomes a routine land as-
sembly (and LULU) problem.  Eminent domain remains a tool for de-
entrenching the earlier decision, but no more than many government poli-
cies that require building any new facility; the problem is the same whether 
it is a jail or garage.  But the example again stops being routine if there is 
something special about the location of the existing House of Detention—it 
is near the courthouse and easily accessible by public transportation, for 
example.  In that case, selling off the lot could limit detention policies for 
subsequent governments unless they had the power to reacquire the proper-
ty. 
Here, again, eminent domain never had to be considered because the 
City had retained the jail facility—wisely, it seems, in retrospect.  But the 
example is still a good one.  Some kinds of assets are simply difficult to re-
place after the City decides to sell them, like jails and landfills and others 
that require specific locations.  A subsequent government may have no op-
portunity to revisit the policy decision that led to the sale of the asset with-
out the ability to take back the underlying property. 
 
 63. See Elizabeth Hays, Sell Shut Downtown Brooklyn Jail to Raise Cash, Bloomberg 
Urged, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_ 
local/brooklyn/2008/04/30/2008-04-30_sell_shut_downtown_brooklyn_jail_to_rais.html. 
 64. Id. 
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III.  EVALUATING EMINENT DOMAIN 
Eminent domain plays an important but seldom observed role in preserv-
ing policy flexibility and democratic accountability.  But what does this 
mean for eminent domain?  It is impossible to develop a set of prescriptions 
without a more fully formed theory of stability in policymaking.  It is, 
however, possible to gesture at the kinds of questions that need to be asked, 
and at how the appropriate reach of eminent domain depends on the an-
swers. 
Imagine a world in which policy had no inertial force.  In this kind of 
science fictional alternate reality, the status quo would hold no sway, and 
governments could truly legislate as if on a blank slate every day.  Though 
perhaps a halcyon vision for some, most people would find this a gross 
dystopia, a kind of Logan’s Run of private rights.65 
The problem, in its most general form, is that some measure of stability 
in legal regimes is necessary for people to rely on government policies.  
Reliance, in turn, is a prerequisite for inducing investments, creating psy-
chological stability, reducing agency monitoring costs, and more.  Policy 
friction, in other words, serves important interests. Calibrating eminent 
domain, then, should be attentive to these twin goals of preserving flexibili-
ty and inducing reliance on government precommitments. 
From the perspective of entrenchment, what, then, should eminent do-
main look like?  It should be available as a backstop when a government 
wants to change course.  Without eminent domain, a government could use 
private rights—property conveyances, vested rights, physical development, 
and contractual obligations—to immunize policies from change. The pri-
vate rights holders might be complicit in the effort.  They might be devel-
opers seeking to vest their rights or companies seeking long-term benefits 
like parking meters, regardless of the cost to the public.  But the rights 
holders might also be “innocent” third parties, private landowners who 
have no independent interest in the temporal reach of a government policy 
but who nevertheless seize good land use opportunities when they arise, or 
build in a way that takes advantage of existing roads, waterfront access, or 
regulatory conditions.  In either case, private rights threaten to entrench 
government policies in the absence of eminent domain. 
On the other hand, eminent domain cannot be so easy to use that its 
availability undermines private reliance on government precommitments.  
 
 65. See LOGAN’S RUN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976).  In this classic science fiction 
film, all people enter the “Carousel” at the age of thirty, where they believe they will be re-
born as infants.  In fact, they are simply killed, so that there are no old people on earth.  The 
analogy here is that private rights would terminate automatically and prematurely so that no 
stale rights would exist. 
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If eminent domain were free or very easy to exercise, then it might make 
government policies too malleable.  People would not build, and it could 
become prohibitively difficult to stimulate private investment.  As a de-
entrenching tool, eminent domain must therefore be widely available but 
sufficiently costly (politically and economically) for governments to exer-
cise, so that private parties can be induced to rely on government commit-
ments.  Interestingly, the fair market value compensation requirement, 
coupled with the due process costs of eminent domain, generate outcomes 
that at least resemble an appropriate compromise between these two com-
peting pressures. 
Whether or not it is well calibrated today, it is at least important to rec-
ognize that the availability of eminent domain, at some price, is crucial to 
preventing entrenchment.  Public policy decisions are not just reflected in 
legislative enactments and municipal ordinances.  They are also captured in 
the inter-connected web of the built environment and vested contractual 
and property rights that often have more binding power than inherently 
mutable public laws.  Eminent domain, therefore, serves an important role 
in preserving subsequent governments’ ability to respond to the will of 
their constituents. 
